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Título: Procesos subyacentes más allá de la producción de perspectiva fal-
sa. 
Resumen: El objetivo del presente estudio consistió en determinar si los 
procedimientos de análisis de contenido basados en las propuestas de Reali-
ty Monitoring (RM) pueden aportar información útil para discriminar entre 
declaraciones verdaderas y falsas. Se pidió a los participantes que describie-
ran un accidente de tráfico desde su papel real de testigo o que lo describie-
ran simulando ser la víctima. Los datos se analizaron en función de la exac-
titud y calidad de los relatos, y se representaron gráficamente mediante Vi-
sualización Hiperdimensional (HDV). En el experimento 1 (inter-sujetos) 
los relatos de las víctimas simuladas contenían más alusiones a procesos 
cognitivos, más auto-referencias y menos cambios de orden. En el experi-
mento 2 (intra-sujetos) los relatos de las víctimas simuladas también conte-
nían más alusiones a procesos cognitivos y más auto-referencias, pero ade-
más fueron menos exactos y aportaron menos información irrelevante y 
más juicios y comentarios personales. Los gráficos HDV indican que los re-
latos falsos difieren holísticamente de los reales. 
Palabras clave: Memoria autobiográfica; detección de mentira; psicología 
del testimonio; credibilidad; análisis de contenido; visualización hiperdi-
mensional; escalado multidimensional; holístico.  
  Abstract: This study aimed to determine the extent to which Reality Moni-
toring (RM) content analysis can provide useful information when discrim-
inating between actual versus false statements. Participants were instructed 
to either describe a traffic accident as eyewitness actual role or to describe 
the accident as a simulated victim. Data were analysed in terms of accuracy 
and quality, and were represented using high dimensional visualization 
(HDV). In Experiment 1 (between-participant design), participants made 
significantly more references to cognitive operations, more self-references 
and less changes in order when describing the event as simulated victim. In 
Experiment 2 (within-participants design) participants also made signifi-
cantly more references to cognitive operations and more self references 
when describing the event from the simulated victim as well as being less 
accurate, providing less irrelevant information and more evaluative com-
ments. HDV graphics indicated that false statements differ holistically 
from actual ones.  
Key words: Autobiographical memory; deception detection; eyewitness 
testimony; credibility; criteria content analysis; high dimensional visualiza-
tion; multidimensional scaling; holistic. 
 
Introduction 
 
In order to distinguish the origin of memories, people would 
undertake a process of comparing the characteristic attrib-
utes of memories of different origins. This process has been 
called Reality Monitoring (Johnson & Raye, 1981), or in a more 
generally forms Source Monitoring (Johnson, Hashtroudi & 
Lindsay, 1993). Since the proposal of the Reality Monitoring 
(RM) model and the use of phenomenological content anal-
ysis to differentiate between memories from different 
sources, there have been numerous studies investigating dis-
tinctive characteristics of memories from a wide variety of 
sources such as actual memories from perceptual processes, 
and self-generated memories from imagination, dreams, fan-
tasies, false memories and post-event implanted memories. 
In their original proposal, Johnson and Raye (1981) suggest-
ed that perceptual memories would have more contextual, 
sensorial and semantic attributes whilst self-generated mem-
ories would have more information about cognitive opera-
tions. Subsequent research (Manzanero & Diges, 1995; 
Manzanero, 2006; Santtila, Roppola, & Niemi, 1998; School-
er, Gerhard, & Loftus, 1986; Strömwall, Bengtsson, Lean-
der, & Granhag, 2004; Vrij, 2005) has identified additional 
attributes to include, amongst others, doubts, irrelevant in-
formation, explanations, self-references, exaggerations, per-
sonal involvement, judgements and comments, pauses, 
spontaneous corrections, changes in order, length of de-
scription... whilst other researchers have proposed alterna-
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tive criteria to evaluate the credibility of testimonies in spe-
cific criminal cases (Jones & McGraw, 1987; Steller & 
Köhnken, 1989; Trankell, 1972; Undeutsch, 1989).  
However, the evidence about potential differences be-
tween true and false statements is largely inconsistent. Vrij, 
Akehurst, Soukara and Bull (2004) found significant differ-
ences in the expected direction regarding logical structure, 
amount of details, contextual information, descriptions of 
interaction, conversation reproduction, visual, audio, spatial 
and temporal details and cognitive operations. No effects 
were found however regarding mental state attributions, 
acknowledgement of lack of memory and doubts. Other 
studies however fail to find such marked differences. Porter 
and Yuille (1996) analysed differences between the two types 
of statements using some of the content criteria from Crite-
ria-Based Content Analysis (CBCA) procedure for credibility 
assessment (Köhnken, Manzanero, & Scott, 2015; Steller & 
Köhnken, 1989). Out of the 17 criteria employed only three 
yielded significant differences: amount of detail provided, 
logical structure and acknowledgement of lack of memory. 
Although the CBCA came independently to the studies on 
the RM processes, assumptions are shared, and both have 
been proposed as a method to assess the credibility of the 
statements with similar results, albeit RM could be more 
sensitive than CBCA (Granhag, Strömwall, & Landström, 
2006). Sporer and Sharman (2006) analysed made-up or true 
autobiographical data according to clarity, how vivid they 
were, sensory, spatial and temporal information, quality of 
the memory, significance and realism, in the theoretical 
framework of RM. Results showed significant differences in 
the predicted direction only for temporal information and 
realism.  
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Different reasons can be argued to explain the incon-
sistency of the results and the lack of differences between 
real and false statements. a) Mounting evidence (Bensi, 
Gambetti, Nori, & Giusberti, 2009; Campos & Alonso-
Quecuty, 1998; Colwell, Hiscock-Anisman, Memon, Colwell, 
Taylor, & Woods, 2009; Comblain, D'Argembeau & Van der 
Linden, 2005; Diges, 1995; Diges, Rubio & Rodríguez, 1992; 
Henkel, Franklin & Johnson, 2000; Manzanero, El-Astal & 
Aróztegui, 2009; Memon, Fraser, Colwell, Odinot & Mas-
troberardino, 2010; Pérez-Mata & Diges, 2007; Roberts & 
Lamb, 2010) suggests that numerous factors (activation lev-
els, coherence and previous knowledge, perceptual modality, 
subjects’ involvement degree and perspective, age, contextu-
al factors, type of design used in the research, training of the 
evaluators, and the coding method) influence the character-
istics of statements. b) There is also great variability in the 
possible origins of memories and different sources produce 
distinctive characteristics which vary depending on whether 
they are from fantasy, lies, dreams or post-event information 
(Hekkanen & McEvoy, 2005; Johnson, Kahan & Raye, 1984; 
Sporer & Sharman, 2006; Vrij et al., 2004). c) Moreover, 
within each source there are different degrees on a continu-
um from perceptual memories to the most fantastic memo-
ries. For instance it is not the same to imagine a complete 
event than to change a detail of a perceptual memory, for 
example when a witness pretend to have been the victim, or 
a perpetrator pretend to be a witness. In these cases, the 
person has experienced the event and has all the information 
pertaining to this event but his role is very different from the 
one he is portraying. When adopting a false role, the accura-
cy and phenomenological characteristics of the description 
of an event may be affected. According to the RM model 
(Johnson & Raye, 1981; Johnson et al., 1993) the statements 
from real witness should be characterised by attributes asso-
ciated to perceptual memories whilst witnesses adopting a 
false role should provide a very different statement charac-
teristic of self-generated memories. In a seminal study An-
derson and Pichert (1978) asked participants to remember a 
story from the perspective of a prospective buyer or a pro-
spective burglar. Results showed that participants remem-
bered different details from each perspective and so they 
concluded that having a specific schema may affect encod-
ing as well as recovery and they also suggested that different 
relevance criteria determine whether details are accessible or 
not, even when they all are stored in memory.  
The present study aimed to further our understanding of 
the differences between actual and false statements by ana-
lysing the attributes of statements produced by witnesses 
that supplant the role of the victim of an event. More specif-
ically, actual statements given by observers were compared 
with statements given by simulated victims (eyewitnesses 
who pretend to be a victim). Therefore, false accounts are 
provided by witnesses who play a role that is false, and 
knowing that this is not true they intent to deceive in their 
testimonies. 
According to the RM model it was predicted that actual 
statements would present more sensorial and contextual in-
formation, less references to cognitive processes, less 
doubts, explanations and self-references and would be 
shorter than false statements. Other attributes that could be 
of use to discriminate between the two types of statements 
such as spontaneous corrections, unstructured production, 
exaggerations, and judgements and personal comments will 
also be explored in this study. Two alternative theoretical 
perspectives will be tested: a general lying theory will be 
compared to a differential lying theory. The general lying 
theory states a unique, general, way to build the lying state-
ment, leading to homogeneous differences across partici-
pants in statements when compared with those not lying. 
On the other hand, the differential lying theory states that 
each person uses its own set of believes when trying to solve 
the problem on how to build a credible lying statement. Dif-
ferent beliefs may lead to differences with respect to those 
not trying to lie, but the differences may be heterogeneous. 
For example, if a person believes that a more detailed state-
ment is more credible, it will likely show more details that 
those not trying to lie, while another person believing that 
too many details looks like a prepared statement, may pro-
duce less details than those not trying to lie. 
When attempting to discriminate true and false memo-
ries we are faced with two possibilities. The first scenario is 
that some of the variables can significantly and consistently 
discriminate between both types of memories, in which case 
data analyses of paired comparisons are appropriate. A se-
cond alternative however is that the distinction between the 
two types of memories is only possible when all variables are 
considered simultaneously in a holistic way. Thus in this 
study in addition to utilising paired comparisons of accuracy 
and quality measures, high dimensional visualization (HDV) 
was employed to represent and explore complex patterns of 
interactions between variables. This technique is a multivari-
ate analysis used in psychology (Clark-Carter, 2004; Man-
zanero et al., 2009; Manzanero, Alemany, Recio, Vallet & 
Aróztegui, 2015; Manzanero, López, Aróztegui, & El-Astal, 
2015; Roskam, 1989; Tversky & Krantz, 1970) and other 
disciplines (Barton & Valdés, 2008; Romero, Valdés & Bar-
ton, 2007) to predict outcomes from a large set of variables. 
If discrimination rates of true and false statements are more 
successful analysing patterns of interactions than pairwise 
comparisons it would suggest that it may be time to discard 
simpler general models of credibility assessments in favour 
of more complex differential theoretical models of decep-
tion. 
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Experiment 1 
 
Method 
 
Design 
 
An unifactorial design was employed using reality of de-
scription as the between-participant factor with two levels: a) 
actual witness and b) simulated victims. There were two cat-
egories of dependent measures: accuracy and qualitative 
measures. Considering the RM theoretical framework, accu-
racy measures include correct information, amount of correct 
details provided; and distortions, incorrectly described details 
or fabrications. 
Qualitative measures include sensory information, infor-
mation relating to sensory aspects of the event: colours, siz-
es...; contextual information, information about spatial and tem-
poral aspects of the environment in which the event takes 
place; cognitive operations, explicit allusion to cognitive opera-
tions; doubtful expressions, expressions that indicate doubts 
about the description in hand (i.e., it could be, it appears, I 
think, it is probable...); irrelevant information, correct infor-
mation that does not form part of the pre-established script. 
It is used for the overall correct information variable; expla-
nations, information that adds to purely sensorial or contex-
tual information, such as, for instance, a functional descrip-
tion of some aspect of the event; spontaneous corrections, cor-
rections made by the participant that appear crossed out, 
corrected or added to the text; change in order, changes in the 
order in which the event took place; exaggerations, descrip-
tions in which the quality of the events is over or under-
reported; judgements and personal comments, judgements about 
some aspect of the event and personal additions; self-references, 
number of first person pronouns or first person verb forms 
that revealed a pronoun in the deeper structure; and length of 
the narrative, the number of words of the report.  
 
Participants 
 
Thirty psychology university students (21 female and 9 
male) were randomly selected and allocated to two groups 
corresponding to the two types of descriptions under scruti-
ny. The ages ranged between 17 and 27 years old, with mean 
age of 19.16 years (SD= 2.61).  
 
Materials 
 
A complex event employed in previous studies (e.g. 
Manzanero & Diges, 1995; Manzanero, 2009) was presented 
to participants. This event was presented as a short film, 29 
sec. in length and without sound. This consisted of a cross 
roads collision between two cars. The clip starts with a car 
moving amongst other vehicles in a street by a park. The car 
arrives to a cross roads, stops and immediately starts again 
and collides at low speed with another vehicle coming from 
the side. The end of the film shows the outcome of the col-
lision, the first vehicle has been pushed along the cross 
roads and is seriously damaged.  
All participants were told in advance about the nature of 
the event; of its brevity and lack of sound. They watched the 
film in a colour TV monitor in a classroom at the university. 
The recall of the event took place in the same lecture thea-
tre. An analysis protocol was used to measure the accuracy 
of descriptions provided by the study subjects. This protocol 
describes the event through propositions, and it has been 
shown to be useful in accuracy assessment, to avoid bias and 
to facilitate scoring (Manzanero & Diges, 1995).  
 
Procedure 
 
Participants were asked to watch carefully the TV moni-
tor where a short clip showing a traffic accident was pre-
sented. Immediately after watching the clip, participants per-
formed a distractor task for 10 minutes, which involved de-
scribing an itinerary on the university campus from the rail-
way station to the School of Psychology. Once completed, 
participants were asked to describe the clip. Fifteen partici-
pants were asked to describe it as much detail as possible as 
if they were the victim of the accident and fifteen partici-
pants were asked to remember as much detail as possible 
from their actual role as eyewitness. 
 
Data Analysis 
 
Reliability: The protocols of the free narrative account 
were submitted to two expert coders for content analysis. 
The expert coders, were trained specially for this study with 
examples taken from each category. To assess the codings’ 
reliability for within- and between-coders, the Agreement 
Index [AI= agreements/ (agreements + disagreements)] was 
computed. In all of the variables measured, this was greater 
than the cut-off .80 (Tversky, 1977).  
HDV graphs: To explore the holistic complex patterns 
that underlie the construction of lies, HDV graphs were 
used, considering all content criteria simultaneously (Man-
zanero et al., 2009). This technique is linked, at its root, to a 
scatter plot. The different variables corresponding to each 
statement are represented as a point in a high dimensional 
space. When having more than three variables, such as it is 
the case in this study, mathematical techniques are required 
to reduce dimensionality to allow a 3D graphical representa-
tion. This study employed multidimensional scaling in order 
to reduce dimensionality (Buja, Swayne, Littman, Dean, 
Hofmann & Chen, 2008; Steyvers, 2002). Each point in the 
hyperspace has a distance to each other point. Multidimen-
sional scaling will search 3D points preserving those distanc-
es between points as much as possible. Distance between 
points will be calculated using a normalized euclidean dis-
tance (Barton & Valdés, 2008) as shown below: 
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The normalized euclidean distance is equivalent to regu-
lar euclidean distance but the apparent higher distance due 
to a high number of dimensions is corrected though normal-
ization (that is, considering p, the number of dimensions). 
The quality of the 3D transformation is measured through 
the Sammon’s Error (Barton & Valdés, 2008; Romero, Val-
dés & Barton, 2007) as follows: 
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Where ij is the distance (or dissimilarity) between 
points i and j in the original space and ij  is the distance in 
the reduced dimensionality 3D space. Therefore, Sammon’s 
Error compares the differences between the original dis-
tances between points, in the original hyperspace, and the 
final distance among the new representing points in the 3D 
space. If distances are similar, the error is small as few in-
formation is lost in the transformation. If distances are high, 
the error is high as more information is lost in the transfor-
mation. Sammon’s error value should be interpreted as the 
proportion of distance difference with respect to the original 
distance. For example, .05 means that the average difference 
between distances is 5 percent with respect to the original 
distance. 
 Finally, the 3D points are represented using Virtual Real-
ity Modelling Language (VRML). VRML files allow graph-
ical rotation and exploration to facilitate graphical data anal-
ysis. Two HDV graphs were used in each of the experi-
ments. The first HDV graph represented only the variables 
that yielded significant differences in the statistical analyses, 
whilst the second HDV included all variables regardless of 
whether they were significant in the pairwise statistical com-
parisons. Finding that there was a significant increase in clas-
sification power with all the variables included would sug-
gest that valuable information may be lost by using the tradi-
tional classification system of statistical pairwise compari-
sons.  
 
Results 
 
Once statements were transcribed, they were analysed 
according to the categories described above. Results for ac-
curacy and qualitative measures are reported separately. 
 
Accuracy measures 
 
No significant group differences were found in accuracy 
measures. See Table 1 for a summary of results. 
 
Table 1. Average scores (and standard deviations) in accuracy and qualitative measures in Experiment 1. 
Type of account Actual witness Simulated victim Effect Size (r) 
Accuracy details 14.66 (3.35) 14.18 (4.03) .064 
Distortions 1.40 (1.59) 1.46 (1.64) -.018 
Sensory information 4.33 (2.09) 3.60 (1.50) .196 
Contextual information 7.33 (3.98) 7.86 (3.81) -.067 
Cognitive operations* .60 (.98) 2.20 (1.85) -.475 
Hesitant expressions .60 (.74) .26 (.46) .265 
Spontaneous corrections 2.66 (2.53) 1.66 (1.76) .223 
Change of order*  .40 (.51) .06 (.26) .387 
Explanations 1.73 (1.39) 1.13 (1.30) .217 
Exaggerations .73 (.80) .53 (.64) .136 
Irrelevant information  1.13 (1.30) .46 (.52) .320 
Judgements and comments 2.13 (1.77) 1.46 (1.64) .192 
Self-references* .46 (1.06) 9.20 (4.52) -.799 
Length 153.46 (61.48) 123.60 (49.54) .258 
* Significant differences 
 
Qualitative measures 
 
Significant differences were found on self-references, 
cognitive operations and change of order. Participants de-
scribing the event as simulated victim had more self-
references (t(28)=7.281, p<.01 rγ =.809), more cognitive 
operations (t(28)=2.945, p<.01, rγ=.486), and less changes 
of order (t(28)=2.269, p<.05, rγ=.394), than those describ-
ing the event as eyewitness. Results can be seen in Table 1. 
The HDV results are shown in Figures 1a and 1b. Figure 
1a represents the three variables that yielded significance in 
the statistical analyses. The classification obtained using only 
these three variables was not optimal, with only 80 percent 
of cases correctly classified. 
Figure 1b represents all variables regardless of whether 
their values in both groups were significantly different in the 
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statistical analyses. The quality of the dimensionality reduc-
tion through MDS was very good, highwith a small sam-
mon´s error (sammon´s error = .027). In this case, the dot-
ted line graphically discriminating actual witness and simu-
lated victims, provides a correct classification in 96.7 percent 
of cases, a remarkably better discrimination than the classifi-
cation obtained just using the statistically significant varia-
bles.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 1a. HDV graph including statistically significant variables only in Experiment 1. No sammon error is shown as no di-
mensionality reduction was needed with only 3 variables. The dotted line indicates the best graphical classification of data. 
 
 
 
Figure 1b. HDV graph including all variables in used in Experiment 1 (between-participants). Length of narrative was nor-
malized with respect to the rest of variables in order to prevent a distortion in data interpretation due to just one variable. 
 
Discussion  
 
Only a few significant differences were found between 
actual and false statements. As predicted, participants made 
significantly more references to cognitive operations and 
more self-references when describing the event as simulated 
victim. Contrary to predictions simulated victims made few-
er changes in order in the perceptual condition.  
One possible explanation for the lack of differences in 
the statistical analyses may relate to the use of a between-
participants design. In a previous study, Bensi and cols. 
(2009) have shown that the methodological design, whether 
within or between-participants, influences credibility dis-
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crimination. Specifically, they found significant differences 
between truth and deception using within-participants de-
sign but not with a between-participants design. Undeutsch 
(1989) suggests that to analyse credibility of statements in 
terms of content analyses it is necessary to compare a state-
ment known to be true with the target statement by the 
same individual. A second experiment was therefore de-
signed to compare descriptions of the same participants un-
der the two conditions of actual witness and false victims to 
enable us to answer this question. It was expected that this 
manipulation would increase the differences between condi-
tions on both accuracy and quality measures. 
 
Experiment 2 
 
Method 
 
Design  
 
The same design as in Experiment 1 was employed in 
this experiment, except that the independent variable 
(whether the statement was actual or false) was tested with a 
within-participant design. The same dependent variables, ac-
curacy and quality, were measured. 
The same materials and procedure as in experiment 1 
were used. 
 
Participants 
 
Thirty-five psychology university students were random-
ly selected and assigned to two groups. The first group 
comprised of 18 participants and they described the clip as 
simulated victim first followed by the description as actual 
witness. The remaining 17 participants described the event 
in the reverse order, first as actual witness and then as simu-
lated victim.  
 
Data Analysis 
 
The same reliability procedures and HDV representa-
tions were used as in Experiment 1. Equally, to assess the 
codings’ reliability for within- and between-coders, the 
Agreement Index was computed. In all of the variables 
measured, this was greater than the cut-off .80 (Tversky, 
1977).  
 
Results 
 
As in the previous experiment, once descriptions were 
transcribed they were analysed according to the categories 
mentioned earlier. Results are also presented separately for 
accuracy and quality measures. 
 
Accuracy measures 
 
Statements were significantly more accurate in the ob-
server condition than in the simulated condition 
(t(34)=3.479, p<.01, rγ=.269). No differences were found 
for distortions between the two conditions. See Table 2 for a 
summary of results. 
 
Table 2. Average scores (and standard deviations) in accuracy and qualita-
tive measures in Experiment 2. 
Type of account 
Actual 
 witness 
Simulated  
victim 
Effect 
Size (r) 
Accuracy details* 14.94 (3.51) 12.71 (4.42) .269 
Distortions 1.48 (1.98) 1.71 (2.44) -.051 
Sensory information 3.91 (2.34) 3.28 (3.93) .097 
Contextual information 7.94 (4.71) 7.28 (4.32) .073 
Cognitive operations* .82 (1.65) 3.08 (2.56) -.465 
Hesitant expressions .42 (.65) .51 (1.01) -.053 
Spontaneous corrections 1.88 (2.03) 2.08 (2.76) -.041 
Change of order  .20 (.41) .05 (.24) .217 
Explanations 1.20 (1.28) 1.23 (1.11) -.012 
Exaggerations .57 (.70) .57 (.70) 0 
Irrelevant information * 1.02 (1.27) .40 (.65) .294 
Judgements and comments* 1.34 (1.61) 2.77 (2.74) -.303 
Self-references* .60 (1.06) 11.68 (3.61) -.901 
Length 139.00 (66.59) 147.68 (62.04) -.067 
*Significant differences 
 
Qualitative measures 
 
Significantly more self-references, less irrelevant infor-
mation and more judgements and personal comments, and 
references to mental processes were found in false state-
ments than in actual ones (t(34)=11.423, p<.01, rγ=.901; 
t(34)=3.061, p<.01, rγ=.294; t(34)=3.515, p<.01, rγ=.303; 
t(34)=4.218, p<.01, rγ=.465, respectively). For a summary 
of results see Table 2. 
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Figure 2a Within-participants  HDV graph including statistically significant variables only. 
 
 
 
Figure 2b. HDV graph including all variables in used in Experiment 2 (within-participants). Length of narrative was nor-
malized with respect to the rest of variables in order to prevent a distortion in data interpretation due to just one variable. 
 
 
As in the previous Experiment, a HDV representation 
was employed using, first, only the four variables that were 
significant in the statistical analyses (see Figure 2a). The 
quality of the dimensionality reduction was very good, with a 
sammon’s error = .003. The plane used to classify (separat-
ing points in 2 groups) permits a value of correct classifica-
tion of 86.7 percent. 
Figure 2b shows the HDV graph including all variables 
measured in Experiment 2. The dimensionality reduction 
quality again was very high, with a sammon’s error = .034. 
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When discriminating data using the best possible plane, a 
94.3 percent correct classification of statements (true or 
false) was achieved. This is a significant improvement from 
the classification achieved by including only those variables 
that produced significant differences in the statistical anal-
yses. 
 
Discussion 
 
Whilst in Experiment 1, using a between-participants design, 
no differences were found in accuracy and amount of irrele-
vant information, using a within-participant design has pro-
duced significant differences in both these measures. Simu-
lated victims’ statements contained less accurate and less ir-
relevant information than actual witnesses’ statements.  In 
contrast, both studies have showed consistent differences in 
references to cognitive operations and self-references. 
Moreover, the within-participant design also produced dif-
ferences in personal commentaries whilst the between-
participant design has produced differences in changes of 
order. Significant differences found in relation to cognitive 
operations, are probably due to processes relating to the re-
construction of the event to integrate information with the 
simulated victim. This reconstruction, according to the RM 
model (Johnson & Rye, 1981) may be the result of false ac-
counts undergoing a process of internalisation.  
Leaving aside the effects due to processes of internalisa-
tion, differences between witnesses’ and simulated victim’s 
statements, when taking into account the results from classi-
cal statistical analysis, are minimal regardless of whether a 
between- or within-participants design was employed. The 
failure to discriminate between both statements using pair-
wise comparisons, seems to be related to the underlying the-
oretical perspective as in contrast in both experiments HDV 
representations showed different complex patterns for two 
types of statements. 
 
Conclusions 
 
It seems rather difficult to discriminate between statements 
when an eyewitness pretends to be another person involved 
in the event with a different role, in this case a simulated vic-
tim. This adds to existing evidence showing little differences 
in memories from different sources. The few differences 
found in adults when recalling emotional events, such as a 
traffic accident, point to a good ability to generate different 
credible versions of the same event. The few differences 
found can also explain as well why it is difficult to judge the 
credibility of statements, as many other studies show 
(Santtila et al., 1998; Schooler et al., 1986; Strömwall et al., 
2004; Vrij, 2005).  
If we apply the content criteria defined by Steller and 
Köhnken (1989) using the SVA/CBCA technique, it would 
still be difficult to discriminate between actual and false 
statements as only three variables showed significant differ-
ences, namely, unstructured production (changes of order in 
Exp. 1), amount of details provided (accuracy details in Exp. 
2) and superfluous details (irrelevant information in Exp. 2). 
And even though not all criteria can be applied to the recall 
of a traffic accident, no differences were found on measures 
relating to contextual embedding, spontaneous corrections, 
doubts about one’s own memory, and admitting lack of 
memory.  
Adding all variables rather than including only statistical-
ly significant variables increased the differences in both Ex-
periments 1 and 2. This suggests that a complex pattern, not 
detectable with statistical pairwise data analysis, seems to 
underlie simulated victims’ statements. Including all variables 
available, improved classification of actual and false state-
ments from 80 percent to 97.6 percent in Experiment 1 and 
from 86.7 percent to 94.3 percent in Experiment 2. Similar 
results were found in previous studies when actual and simu-
lated victims in people with intellectual disability were com-
pared (Manzanero, Alemany et al., 2015). 
The conclusions stemming from these findings do not 
just relate to the use of pairwise comparisons or HDV tech-
niques. The crucial issue relates to the theoretical assump-
tions behind these differences. If there is a general process 
behind the production of false statements, and if the process 
affects the variables measured in a unique way, single criteri-
on should be enough to discriminate between true and false 
statements. 
In contrast, if what underlies the production of false 
statements is the result of a complex process involving many 
factors, alternative processes, and individual differences on 
what makes a false statement look credible, then using pair-
wise comparisons will not be successful in discriminating be-
tween true and false statements. If this is the case, multidi-
mensional scaling techniques need to be applied.  
Lying is a general cognitive skill appearing quite early in 
cognitive development as part of the development of the 
theory of mind (Feldman, 2006; Flavell et al., 1995; Rochat, 
1999; Zahn-Waxler, Robinson, & Emde, 1992; Lee & 
Homer, 1999). It has been assumed that once children ac-
quire the concept of lying, they start producing lies in a simi-
lar way. In contrast, we propose an alternative model, the dif-
ferential lying theory, which suggests that although the compre-
hension of what is a lie is universal across individuals, 
throughout development beliefs on what makes a statement 
look credible diverge among individuals.  
Past attempts have been made to objectify as much as 
possible the evaluation of credibility in adults through the 
analyses of behavioural and physiological factors related to 
witness’ statements and also through the analyses of the 
content of these statements. None of these methods howev-
er allow the objective evaluation of credibility, and less so, that 
of the veracity, as illustrated by findings of near to 50% of 
errors in discriminating source of accounts (Manzanero & 
Diges, 1994; Santtila et al., 1998; Schooler et al., 1986; 
Strömwall et al., 2004). The findings from the present study 
suggest that previous attempts may have been constrained 
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by the comparison of isolated variables rather than investi-
gating more complex patterns which take into account all 
variables simultaneously. When all variables are taken into 
account the degree of distinction improved considerably. 
Perhaps it is the reason because Hartwig & Bond (2011), as 
a result of a meta-analysis, argued that intuitive notions 
about deception are more accurate than explicit knowledge 
and that lie detection is more readily improved by increasing 
behavioural differences between liars and truth tellers than 
by informing lie-catchers of valid cues to deception. Intui-
tion judgements can take into consideration more criteria to 
distinguish between both statements than explicit knowledge 
based on content criteria techniques. Anyway, intuition 
seems to be few effective when accuracy credibility assess-
ment is the goal (Manzanero, Quintana, & Contreras, 2015).  
The results from this study however should be taken 
with caution as it is only a first exploratory study which as-
sesses only one variable -simulated victim- and thus would 
need further confirmation in future research. 
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